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BABE: THE TALE OF THE SPEAKING MEAT
Val Plumwood
'You look a little shy: let me introduce you to that leg
of mutton,' said the Red Queen. Alice-Mutton: MuttonAlice'. The leg of mutton got up in the dish and made a
little bow to Alice, and Alice returned the bow, not
knowing whether to be frightened or amused.
'May I give you a slice?' she said, taking up the a slice?'
she said, taking up the knife and fork, and looking from one
Queen to the other.
'Certainly not,' the Red Queen said, very decidedly: 'it
isn't etiquette to cut anyone you've been introduced to.
Remove the joint!'
Alice Through the Looking Glass
Part 1
1. The Unprejudiced Heart
2. The Paradox of the Speaking Meat
3. The Communicative Model
Part 11

- in next issue of this journal

4. Communication and Anthropomorphism
5. Meat and the Colonising Contract

1 : The Unprejudiced Heart
I would like somebody somewhere to endow an annual prize for a work
of art which takes a group of the most oppressed subjects and makes an
effective and transformative representation of their situation. The work
would make its audience care about what happens to those oppressed
subjects and to understand something of the audience's own role in
maintaining their oppression. It would foster recognition of the
subjectivity and creativity of the oppressed group and consciousness of
the need for redistribution of respect and of cultural and material goods.
Above all, it would help to support and protect them. If these are subjects
who are conventionally seen as radically excluded, for example as
beyond the possibility of communication or as embodied in ways which
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occasion aversion or anxiety, the prize work should attempt to disrupt
those violence-prone perceptions.
One of my nominations for such a prize would be the film Babe. Before
seeing the film, I would have doubted that it was possible to make a
highly successful film for mass audiences that could do those things for
one of the most oppressed subjects in our society, the meat pig. One
feature that made this achievement possible was that the film
successfully disrupted the adult/child boundary and created space for
adults to share certain kinds of openness to and sympathy for animals,
permitted to children but normally out of bounds for mature adults. This
is one of the devices which enables the film, like Dick King-Smith's
prize-winning book The Sheep-Pig on which it is based1, to succeed to a
remarkable degree in opening for the pig the 'unprejudiced heart' invoked
in the narrator's opening sentence. It is not just the film's
problematisation of the concept of meat that makes this film
philosophically interesting; it also poses many ethico-political questions,
analogous to questions in post-colonial theory, about the distinction
between meat and non-meat animals and the role of the human contract
with those special more privileged 'pet' animals who can never be 'meat'.
Because the main theme of Babe turns around the refusal of
communicative status to animals, the film is of considerable interest for
philosophical accounts of human-animal relations. The story provides a
rich context for thinking about this communicative status, about the
inadequacy of narrow rationalist accounts of communication, about
representations of animal communication and the charge of
anthropomorphism, and about the contradictions and paradoxes
disclosed when we recognise the meat as a communicative subject. Babe
repeatedly problematises the kind of prejudice that relegates the other
that is our food to the category of 'meat', a sphere of radical otherness
marked by rational
deficiency, reduction to an impoverished,
mechanistic concept of 'body', and exclusion from communicative
status. The pig Babe soon talks his way smartly around the assumption
that because he is a meat animal, he is 'too stupid to understand'; the
storyline refutes the sheep-dog Fly's dismissal of sheep-talk as 'just so
much rubbish, to which she never paid any attention'. The refusal of
communicative status to animals is a crucial, formative arena where
radical exclusion and silencing strategies which affect both humans and
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animals are developed and perfected. Babe thus provides many insights
into closure strategies as they affect both humans and nonhumans.
Babe also offers a recognition of communicative virtues and
characteristics as central to both human and nonhuman forms of life, and
offers a vision of the emergence of communicative forms of relationship
as victorious alternatives to forms based on violence, domination and
terror. The film does not explore the ethical and political ambiguities of
communicative forms, which are potentially rather more compatible with
oppression than it suggests, and are implicated in the replacement of
repressive patriarchal models by hegemonic models based on the master
subject, as in certain forms of liberal democratic politics for example.
But as Dryzek2 and Plumwood3 have argued, communicative models of
relationships with nature and animals seem likely to offer us a better
chance of survival in the difficult times ahead than dominant
mechanistic models which promote insensitivity to the others' agency
and denial of our dependency on them. Babe crystallises in a useful way
a clash of models that is critical for our times.
My initial reason for going to the movie however had less to do with
millennial models and more to do with being homesick -- I was away
from Australia for a long period and the film had been shot in a shire
near my home. I hoped to hear again the sounds of the bush -- those
small but intensely evocative background calls -- especially the local
birds and frogs which appear in the background on most soundtracks -that creep up on you unawares to create powerful longings for a muchloved place. But when I took my seat in the darkened cinema,
something else made me cry too, with sorrow and shame for my own
complicity in the dominant cultural tradition of rational human mastery
over animals and nature -- as well as everything else considered beneath
the master realm of reason. These were the powerful opening scenes of
Babe showing the terrible cruelty of the intensive pig farms in which the
pig Babe, treated as living meat, is introduced to us as narrative subject.
These visions of hell took on special power and poignancy for me
because at the time I saw the film, I was living in the second highest
U.S. state for intensive hog production. The state of North Carolina was
a place where one rarely saw farm animals out in the open and many of
the rivers and estuaries were seriously degraded or under assault from
the toxic run-off generated by the intensive factory farms. Many of the
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huge pig 'slaughter facilities' in the U.S. employ largely prison labour.
The work of those who labour on the killing floor of these massive
facilities slaughtering up to 15,000 pigs a day is so terrible and poorly
paid that only the slave-like workforce of the carceral system, or those
coerced by other forms of desperation such as indentured immigrants,
are available as workers. The concentration camps too employed some
categories of prisoners to organise, imprison and execute others. The
treatment of the pigs and that of the prisoners has much in common; in
both cases, the intense segregation of the gulag ensures that the middle
class rarely has to confront the hidden connection between its ugly and
violent reality and their own comfortable and tidy lives. The speech of
both pigs and prisoners is erased or delegitimated, and both are reduced
to living meat. As C. Stone Brown argues, 'African Americans are the
flesh that maintains a profitable "prison industry".'4 As disciplinary
democracy normalises massive incarceration and more of us become
either prisoners or keepers, the fate of nonhuman and human prisoners
increasingly converges.
The nightmarish opening scenes of Babe showed an ugly gulag reality
that was all around but which was banished from thought and sight, and
generally treated, even by the animal liberation movement, as too well
established for serious contest. In these circumstances, who could avoid
being immediately caught up in the little pig's plight, or avoid comparing
the misery of the incarcerated animals with the consumptive pleasures of
the over-privileged humans the next shots cut to? The filmic technique
at this point had us crossing that crucial animal/human subject boundary
with dizzying speed, so fast that our usual distancing defences did not
have time to cut in and tell us that these subjects are not at all
comparable, that humans count and pigs don't. Who could avoid
comparing the pigs' misery with the humans' pleasure, or avoid thoughts
of concentration camps and gas chambers as the pig mothers were torn
from their children and cattle-prodded into that terrible night journey
from which there was no return?
The answer, of course, to this question is: 'quite a lot of people'. Many
people didn't see animals or animal liberation as the topic of the film,
and some reviewers seemed to think it was all about how you could cross
gender and class boundaries and burst categories to make yourself
anything you wanted to be, even a sheep-pig, if you had enough
determination and willpower. For them it was a sophisticated
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postmodern-neoliberal Animal Farm allegory about personal
responsibility, individual merit rewarded, and trying harder. Babe does
have valid things to say to a human audience about not staying in the
boxes convention puts you into, but the message here is also relevant to
breaking down hierarchies of considerability which serve to confine
nonhumans. Some were open to such a metaphorical message about
stereotyping and limitation in the human case, but closed to it in the
nonhuman case. Their inability to see how animals themselves could be
more than conceptual instruments for humans and could themselves be a
topic for a 'serious' film points to their entrapment by a conceptual
framework that assigns animals a status beneath subjectivity and
seriousness. Both assignments are effective defences against hearing the
story of the speaking meat that Babe articulates. The pig Babe speaks
from the most delegitimated subject position possible in our society, that
of the meat, and we have developed strategies for blocking out and not
hearing the speech of those in that position. We could not continue the
sorts of meat practices the pig-human gulag system is based upon
without these kinds of strategies. One of the great strengths of the film is
that it invites us to challenge some of these paradoxes, blocks and
erasures.
2: The Paradox of the Speaking Meat
In the opening scenes of the factory farm we are introduced to the piglet
Babe as the film's main narrative subject (marked by the subject's theme
on the soundtrack, among other marks of subjecthood). We open with a
shot showing real piglets waking in expressive communication, and then
see one of these meat-subjects expressing his/her5 sorrow at the loss of
his mother, and his fear as he is seized by strangers and carried away to
be raffled. As his mother is prodded into the truck, Babe utters his grief
so fleetingly and naturally that we hardly notice that our usual
assumptions have been turned on their heads. The meat animal is being
presented to us as an expressive, narrative subject -- the meat is
speaking. There are several disruptions here. What is disrupted
immediately is the Cartesian stereotype of the machine-animal, the
dominant model which enables the ontological presence, mindlike and
communicative characteristics of animals to be so utterly denied in the
factory farm, where their entire lives are defined and distorted by the
function of serving human appetite. There is paradox in the concept of
speaking meat Babe confronts us with, precisely because the concept of
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meat totally erases that speaking position; there is no possibility of
encountering the meat as expressive, narrative subject.
An inquiry into the concept of meat provides a useful route into
understanding how 'taxonomy' connects ontology with ethics -- how
certain strategies of representation normalise oppression by narrowing
ethically relevant perception, erasing key ethical dimensions of
situations, and sometimes even making the other complicit in their own
oppression through internalising oppressive forms of identity. As Carol
Adams has argued6, the concept of meat justifies oppression by hiding
responsibility for death and the causal connection between the
production of meat and the animal's death. The backgrounding, erasure
or denial of these connections in the abstractly quantitative and
commodified concept of meat Adams terms 'absent referent'. 'Absent
referent' involves a complex process of splitting which renders
unavailable not only the act of killing which makes meat available as a
commodity6, but any recognition of connection between the meat and
those who consume it. To achieve this the concept of meat must
simultaneously establish several profound splits or radical exclusions,
between process-product, mind-body, and us-them. The first of these is
inherent in the commodity form and involves a radical dissociation
which denies the connection between the processes set in motion by our
intentions and the end product of commodified,
quantitativelyspecifiable flesh. The second radically dissociates the subjectivity which
sets these processes in motion from that of its victim, denying their
kinship as socially connected, purposive and communicative beings, and
presenting the victim reductively as flesh. 'You looks at us' says KingSmith's wise old sheep Maa 'and you sees lamb chops'.
The third background assumption involved in modern industrial society's
concept of meat as commodity denies the possibility of human
consumers themselves ever taking the form of meat, by a background
assumption of a hierarchy of use and considerability which is linked to
an alleged hierarchy of mental and communicative capacities between
species, with humans of course at the top. We may daily consume other
animals in their billions, but we never position ourselves reciprocally as
food for these others, not even worms. As consumers of meat who can
never suppose ourselves be meat, we assume the god-position above the
action, positioning our identity outside the framework of ecological
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exchange. The conjunction 'human meat' becomes almost as unthinkable
a possibility as the idea of being introduced to the speaking meat.
The concept of meat is a form of life7 in which taxonomy structures our
moral vision via the ethical and epistemological possibilities it discloses
or denies.8 These sets of background denials enable the presentation of
the other in the instrumental terms that Marilyn Frye has identified as
belonging to the arrogant perspective in which viewers 'organise
everything seen with reference to themselves and their own interests',9 in
this case, in terms of a strong instrumental reductionism which identifies
the other with what is only a part of their being, the part that is of use to
us as flesh. Since eurocentric culture identifies the human in radically
contrasting terms which emphasise, rather than suppress or deny we, in
contrast, are identified as humans in terms which emphasise, rather than
suppress or deny, our subjectivity, and which tend to background our
bodily aspects of identity, beings identified as meat become radically
Other: not only can we never be included in the category of meat
ourselves, we can never be introduced to the meat. These assumptions
together involve a profound and multiple denial of kinship with meat.
There is injustice in each of these denials and reductive modes of
conception. There is injustice for a communicative and ethical being in
being conceived systematically in ways that refuse recognition of this
status and these characteristics. There is injustice for such a being in
being conceived reductively as body, first because such conception
singles its referent out for treatment as radically less than it is, and
second because such an instrumental reductionism defines the other in
terms that assume the right of a 'higher' group supposedly above the
process of exchange to treat them as a resource for their ends. Animals
so conceived are subject to both radical exclusion (as having a radically
different nature discontinuous from that of the human meat consumer)
and extreme homogenisation -- replaceable and interchangeable, their
individuality submerged, they 'drown in the anonymous collectivity' of
the quantitative commodity form meat. The radical exclusion aspect of
the meat concept denies kinship and generates a conceptual distance or
boundary between humanity and its 'meat' which blocks sympathy,
reduces the risk of identification with those so designated, and silences
them as communicative beings. The reductiveness of the meat concept
permits a conceptual strategy designed to block recognition of these
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injustices, and its disruption in the concept of the speaking meat is one
source of the flavour of paradox that lingers around that idea.
But from the injustice of industrial society's institution of meat as
commodity, and the moral cowardice and evasion of the associated
conceptual strategies of denial, we cannot conclude that there is no moral
alternative to a universalised vegetarianism, that there are no other, less
ethically problematic ways to resolve the tensions between conceiving
nonhumans both as communicative others and as food. In the complex
biological exchange which sustains all our lives, we must all gain
sustenance at the expense of the other, 'the one living the other's death,
and dying the other's life', in the words of Heraclitus. Shagbark Hickory
outlines an alternative, non-reductive perspective on this exchange
which does not refuse the moral complexities and perplexities involved:
For most or all American Indians food (plant as well as
animal) is kin. Relationships to plants and animals as, on
the one hand, food and, on the other hand, kin creates a
tension which is dealt with mythically, ritually, and
ceremonially, but which is never denied. It is this refusal to
deny the dilemma in which we are
implicated in this life, a
refusal to take the way of bad faith, moral supremacy, or selfdeception which constitutes a radical
challenge
to
our
relationships to our food. The American Indian view that
considerability goes "all the way
down" requires a response
considerably more sophisticated
than those we have seen in
the West, which consist either in
drawing lines of moral
considerability in order to create an out-group, or in constructing
hierarchies of considerability creating de facto out-groups
in
10
particular cases.
As Shagbark Hickory notes, some forms of vegetarianism remain trapped
in the Western strategies of denial and radical exclusion which create
further out-groups, merely redrawing the boundary of otherness in a
different place, at the border of animality rather than humanity. This
comes about because, as we notice, the dominant Western view places
humans above the systematic exchange processes in which all creatures
become (eventually) food for others, privileging humans as eaters for
whom all others are available as food but who are never themselves
available as food. Some movements toward recognition of kinship
between humans and animals thus take the misguided form of attempting
to extend the privilege of this problematic positioning of humans above
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the exchange process outward to other (selected) groups of animals. At
the same time, such forms of recognition are of necessity highly limited
in the class to which such recognition can be extended. They can only
result in enlarging the class of the privileged, instead of a recognition of
the kinship of all living things in the biological exchanges of food, and
in a retention of the strategies of erasure and denial for the excluded
groups.
In contrast, the indigenous recognition that the central philosophical
problem of human life is that 'all our food is souls' points towards nonreductive practices and understandings of food that resolve the moral
failings of 'bad faith, moral supremacy, [and] self-deception' Shagbark
Hickory finds implicit in the dominant Western meat concept. However,
to the extent that these alternative understandings of food form part of a
different 'form of life', in Wittgenstein's sense11, they are not readily
available, either practically or conceptually, within the context of
contemporary industrial life and its commodified food relationships.
Conversely, the fact that vegetarianism may usually be the course which,
in the context of such a commodity society, will best minimise our
complicity in injustice towards others, does nothing to support the
eurocentric conclusion that vegetarianism is a universal
moral
12
requirement for all people in all societies in all situations.
In contexts where the multiple denials of kinship involved in meat
cannot be successfully made, for example in the case where we have
'been introduced' and have intimate and individual knowledge of the
particular animal to be eaten, we tend to experience powerful tensions
and often profound discomforts over its inclusion in the category of
meat. These tensions and discomforts find expression in traditional
contexts such as New Guinea, where pigs that have been raised as part of
a family are never slaughtered by that family but are exchanged.
Alternative Westerners (for example, subsistence farmers) who aim to
create 'spiritual' food practices in opposition to the dominant
commodified ones sometimes argue that meat eating is ethically
acceptable if you 'take responsibility'. This phrase I think indicates a
search for alternative food practices that avoid the processes of ethical
erasure I have identified in the practices of meat.
In a Western context of individualised ethical choice, such alternatives
would have to mean, for example, the eater taking personal responsibility
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for the eaten animal's fate (which in the case of a domestic animal would
include responsibility for the quality of its life as well as for its death),
and bearing the blame for unnecessary suffering. That would mean
finding ways to acknowledge fully the animal's 'soul' and its kinship, and
to express gratitude and reciprocity, that is, to acknowledge a reciprocal
availabiltiy as food for others. Such conditions, demanding even in the
context of traditional communities, are very difficult to realise, both
materially and psychologically, in the context of contemporary urban
Western life. To the extent that they require establishing new shared
cultural practices and meanings rather than just new individual practices,
ethically sensitive carnivorous practices are not culturally available in
that context.
The paradox of the speaking meat is both the product of a particular
social context, and an indicator of some of the most significant moral
failings of that context. The western solution to the moral dilemmas of
food is the creation of a set of moral dualisms, involving a sharp
discontinuity between those who deserve and those who are beyond
ethical consideration. As we have seen, the speaking meat forces us to
confront the way this moral dualism and discontinuity is based on
reductionism, denial and silencing. Our civilisation's orientation to the
creation of moral dualisms may be one reason for its technological
dominance, since it removes any constraints of respect which might
otherwise hold back development, but it remains an ever ready source of
corruption of our ethical practices. The silencing solutions of moral
dualism are always potentially capable of extension to selected groups
of humans counted as lesser in their humanity, and we have seen this
extension made many times in this century. Although this silencing
possibility is present in any human society, it must be greatly reinforced
by the entrenchment of the dualist model in the basic case of food.
3 : The Communicative Model
The overarching model which subsumes the commodity model of the
animal and its specific modes of and motives for reduction is the
Cartesian-mechanistic reduction of the non-human animal to its body,
and the associated refusal to recognise non-human animals as akin to
human ones in the possession of mind, intention and communication.
Mary Midgley13 and Barbara Noske14 are two philosophers who have
pointed out that the moral failings implicit in the modern, commodified
concept of meat find their philosophical progenitor in Cartesian
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rationalism and the mechanistic model. The rationalist-mechanistic
model of the animal is a key part of the relation between modernity and
the nonhuman world, and its rationality is expressed both in reductive
concepts like meat and in the practices of the factory farm.14 The
mechanistic model erases the possibility of communication by denying
mindlike properties to non-humans; ideals of manipulation and
instrumental rationality are at odds with communicative ideals and with
the conception of the other as a communicative subject. Babe confronts
us with the conflict between the mechanistic model of the factory farm,
and the communicative model of human/animal relations the film
ultimately vindicates. This alternative communicative model is located in
the film in the romantically presented contrast space of the Hoggett's
family farm, where it struggles to emerge in the unconventional role
tolerated for the former meat animal Babe and Babe's communicative
reformation of relationships with the sheep. But the farm itself is the site
of conflict between the communicative and the Cartesian-reductive
models, for it too contains the sinister meat house and the animal regimes
based on fear and force. The conflict between these models is also
represented in the form of the conflict within the taciturn farmer and
between him and the more conventional farm wife.
Nevertheless, animal liberationists have some justification for viewing
the film's major implicit contrast between the factory farm and the family
farm with a sceptical eye. To say that the family farm setting of Babe is
highly romanticised is an understatement. A cynic might say that the
family farm parallels the family as the site of mystifying representations
and idealisations. The contrasts of Babe hide the fact that the family
farm model is compatible with, and normally involves, many oppressive
animal husbandry practices; the destination of most of its animal foodproducing units is ultimately the market, and all that has changed is the
indoor setting. This would be, I think, to ignore the fact that moral
differences of degree can be important; it would be like saying that there
is no moral difference between being a worker on a production line and
an inmate of a concentration camp, because both involve some degree of
reduction and instrumentalisation. If there is a moral difference between
the smaller scale farm and the animal gulag, however, there is also
normally a lot more continuity than Babe makes visible.
But to dismiss the implicit contrast of Babe in this way would be to
miss the point that Babe also makes visible a new possibility - the
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possibility of replacing a dominant model of mechanistic relations by a
communicative one which recognises the animal's status as a
communicative and moral being and revolutionises the moral basis of
relationships with domestic animals. Whether this is compatible with
farming as we know it remains an open question, but one the film
deserves credit for raising. Babe leaves us in no doubt that meat is
violence, and it posits a model of communication in opposition to that
violence, and hence a new vision of relations to domestic animals. It
does not explore the puzzles in that vision, leaving us with various
paradoxes to chew on. But its communicative model presents a final
vision of some power, including the triumph of the communicative skills
and ethic Babe has acquired from the maternal wisdom of the sheep and
various other proxy mothers.
Babe's status as a communicative subject has received so little attention
in the monstrous regime of the gulag that he does not even have an
individual name. But, as we soon discover when Babe is removed
through the device of the raffle to the relatively enlightened world of
the family farm, Babe's status as a communicative subject still has many
obstacles to overcome to gain recognition. Before arrival at the farm,
Babe is initially just a 'worthless little runt', an object to be weighed,
raffled off and eaten. In the idealised world of the Hoggett's traditional
farm, Babe's communicative capacities are initially dimly, then more
clearly, recognised by Farmer Hoggett. But they are not initially
recognised by his wife, who addresses him as 'you lucky little pork chop'
and looks forward to Babe's transformation into the familiar commodity
form of 'two nice hams, two sides of bacon, pork chops, kidneys, liver,
chitterling, trotters etc'.
The film version of Mrs. Hoggett, unlike the book version, is made to
represent the most closed, convention and consumer-bound side of the
human character.15 Although this elaboration of conflicting perspectives
adds some richness to the film's themes and characterisation, the linking
of the conflict between the mechanistic and communicative perspectives
in this way with gender introduces elements of androcentrism into the
story, obscures the real connections between gender and consumerism
and between gender and the mechanistic model,16 and generates
contradictory messages about the affirmation of animality. This emerges
in the film's derogatory representation of the farm wife in animalistic
terms and in the implicit demeaning of women's understanding and tasks
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as consumeristic and materialistic, in contrast to the more 'spiritual'
orientation of the father/farmer. Babe's subjectivity is recognised by
several animal foster mothers, the dog Fly and the sheep Maa, who
develop Babe's communicative and social abilities in the best maternal
traditions. But although Babe's unusual communicative abilities must
ultimately derive from these various mothers (who must have included
the original pig mother he missed so much), it is their completion and
recognition by the father/farmer, represented as the 'unprejudiced heart',
that are positioned in the movie as the key transformative elements for
Babe and for the culture more generally.
The farmer is, for reasons the film leaves unexplored, open to certain
possibilities of animal communication the others around him are closed
to. By various communicative deeds, Babe gradually earns the farmer's
recognition of his subjectivity, or so he believes, but is devastated by the
final -- incredible -- discovery of his status as meat, revealed to him by
the jealous cat. This apparent betrayal, (of almost biblical proportions)
by the father, almost kills Babe, who, like the duck Ferdie, cannot bear to
live as only meat. At this point in the story, as at the beginning and the
end, Babe is positioned as a Christ figure, the feminised, dependent son
who is affirmed and revived by the farmer/father's recognition and love,
expressed in the dance of life. Together Babe and the farmer go on to
accomplish the apparently impossible feat of opening closed minds and
demonstrating Babe's unrecognised communicative ability to the world.
We are invited to conclude that this revolutionises the treatment of pigs
and of farming generally, reformulating it as an activity based on
communication rather than force and violence. The communicative ethic
is also strongly represented by the (female) sheep, whose persistent faith
in and exemplification of the virtues and values of communication and
non-violence is essential to their ultimate victory over the reductive
violence of traditional relationships.
Communicative relationships open up new moral possibilities for
organising life in ways that can negotiate conflicts of interests, build
agreement, trust and mutuality, and avoid instrumentalism and the
imposition of the will of one party on the other by force. Communicative
relations don't necessarily follow out those possibilities however, and it
is important not to romanticise the communicative model, which does
not automatically eliminate the dynamic of power, either in terms of
equality of access, of hierarchy in forms of communication, or of the
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structuring of communication in hegemonic ways. There are various
strategies for taking back the greater equality communicative models
appear to offer. Rationalist models which treat communication as an
exercise in pure, abstract, neutral and universal reason, and which
delegitimate the more emotional and bodily forms and aspects of
communication, operate to exclude nonhumans from full communicative
status just as they exclude various human others accorded lower human
status as further from the rational ideal. These rationalist models exclude
the forms of communication associated with animals along with the
forms of communication associated with women, with non-western
cultures and with less 'educated' classes.17
Communicative models which allow us to overcome these exclusions for
humans will also help us to recognise non-human animals in their denied
aspects as communicative beings, but an excessive emphasis on
communication and its use as a criterion of moral worth or value would
remain problematic for nonhumans in basing itself on a capacity which
may still be highly characteristic of humanity, and in biasing our
valuations heavily towards those species most similar to ourselves. To
overcome this implicit anthrocentrism, a communicative model would
need to be part of plural set of grounds for valuation, rather than its
unique and exclusive basis, and to be sensitive to communicative
capacities within species as well as to their capacities for communication
with humans.
If the film's communicative vision offers hope of moving on to a new
stage beyond mechanism, it also leaves us with many tantalising
questions about this new stage which arise from the ambivalence of
communication. Will communication be on our terms or theirs? Will
Babe's communicative abilities be used for the good of the animals or
for that of the farmer? If the film's account of the moral development of
the farmer (reaching its climax in the step-dance) offers a vision of the
small farm as a putative future enterprise of love and communication
with nature and animals, the film also casts little light on the question of
what the communicative farm would be like. Will the new
communicative paradigm be used to liberate the sheep and the other farm
animals, or merely to oppress them in more subtle and self-complicit
ways? Will the communicative animal farm stand to the mechanistic
farm as the hegemonic communicative forms of liberal democracy stand
to the more repressive forms of patriarchal-authoritarian governance
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they replaced? The distinction between democracy and despotism is
supposedly built on such a contrast, but as it becomes increasingly clear
how little our own society resembles the democratic ideal of free and
open dialogue to which all have access, it also becomes clear how our
communicative abilities can be used to control and imprison us. A new
communicative stage of human-nature relationships would need to place
such questions at the centre of its critical thought: at this level, the tale of
the speaking meat has only just begun.
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